### K

#### First off is the criticism –

#### The plan attempts to remake Mexico in the image of Northern development through economic engagement—challenging the limits of neoliberalism in public spaces is key to politicize alternative strategies and prevent structural violence and cultural subordination

\*Northern discursive strategies repeatedly fail

\*Claiming there are no alternatives legitimizes northern rationality and dooms the cause

\*Already starting—an unflinching stance is necessary to carry it out successfully

Sheppard et al., Minnesota geography professor, 2010

(Eric, “Quo vadis neoliberalism? The remaking of global capitalist governance after the Washington Consensus”, Geoforum, 41.2, ScienceDirect)

We have shown that there have been marked periodic remakings of global capitalist governance from a Washington to a post-Washington consensus, and beyond, in ways that have begun to question some key aspects of global neoliberal governance. Taken together, they hardly represent a consensus. Yet such shifts and disagreementshave been containedwithin a developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary that has, in effect, repeatedly legitimized discourses of first world expertiseeven as the policies based in this expertise repeatedly fail. In this section, we summarize the elements of this imaginary, and discuss how it has persisted even in the wake of crises that create space for alternative imaginaries. The developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary has three components that are closely intertwined: A stageist, teleological thinking that constitutes capitalism, Euro-North American style, as the highest form of development; a leveling metaphor, according to which a flattening of the world equalizes opportunities for all individuals and places; and an imagining of socio-spatial difference as coexisting with this leveling through its commodification. At the center of mainstream policymaking discussed above is the conception of a single trajectory of development, namely capitalist development, along which all places are imagined as sequenced. Rostow famously articulated such a trajectory in his modernist “non-communist manifesto”, The Stages of Economic Growth (Rostow, 1960). As dependency, post-colonial and post-development theorists have argued, this has the effect of presenting places with no choices about what development means, and of ranking places, and their inhabitants, on a scale of development—according to which the prosperous capitalist societies of western Europe and white settler colonies (North America, Australia and New Zealand) occupy the apex, with respect to which other places are imagined as incomplete in their development. This also implies the desirability of erasing or making over less adequate states of affairs, replacing them with their more efficient and rational Northern exemplars. Notwithstanding very substantial shifts and disagreements in how the apex is imagined (as liberal civilization during the colonial era, as Fordist industrialism after 1945, as neoliberal after 1980, and as good governance and poverty reduction after 1997), the effect is to locate expertise at the apex. If all places are on a common path, then those who have reached the end seem naturally pre-destined to teach others about how to achieve this—even when the paternalist advice is ‘don’t do as I do, but do as I say’ (cf. Chang, 2002 and Chang, 2008). The new development economics’ supplement of Keynesian strategies, while critical of and presenting itself as a departure from the Washington Consensus, still endorses a stageist imaginary. Sachs is explicit about his debt to Rostow, framing the specific diagnostic interventions in any nation in terms of the goal of achieving a healthy (first world capitalist) economic body. Sutured to stageist thinking is an imaginary of flattening, of globalization and capitalist development as a process that is flattening out the world, creating a level playing field that equalizes opportunities everywhere. It is this flattening that enables progress along the stages of development—what Blaut has termed a diffusionist conception of development (Blaut, 1993). Some claim that the world is actually flattening out—that socio-spatial positionality matters less and less, with the implication that it is the conditions in a place, rather than its connectivity to the rest of the world, that becomes the important differentiating factor (for critiques of such claims, in both the mainstream and political economic literatures, see Sheppard, 2002 and Sheppard, 2006). The Washington Consensus, in effect, sought to alter the conditions in place; pressing nations to adopt ‘best practice’ neoliberal governance norms, structural adjustment, which would then enable them to progress towards prosperity in a flat world. The ‘new’ development economists acknowledge that the world is not flat. Thus Sachs and Stiglitz argue that certain differences between nations persist in the face of globalization, creating unequal conditions of possibility for development. Sachs argues that certain biophysical differences can never be erased, making places ‘prisoners’ of their geography (Hausmann, 2001). This barrier can be overcome by directing more investment toward and/or giving more policy latitude to, ‘backward’ cities, regions, and nations. Stiglitz stresses how institutions of global governance reinforce power inequalities that disadvantage the global South, arguing for countervailing policies that favor the latter. Both advocate global redistribution and affirmative action for poor nations in order to redress inequalities resulting from disadvantaged geographical or political positionalities, in the belief that such interventions can level the playing field. Again, a flattened world, or leveled playing field, is seen as providing all places with the same opportunities to advance toward prosperity. Yet a flattened world, within this socio-spatial imaginary, does not mean a homogeneous world. Development economics has long recognized that places differ in their resource endowments, arguing that such differences need not be sources of inequality. Rather, each place is enjoined to find its comparative advantage, and trade in global markets on this basis. In doing so, places develop very different economic specializations, each of which is an equal basis for advancing along the developmental trajectory. More recently, both the World Bank and the new development economics have increasingly come to recognize and value persistent differences in cultural norms and practices across the globe, explicitly distancing themselves from previous quasi-orientalist rankings of cultures. Yet such cultural differences are recognized and valorized in terms of how they can be utilized in the market. As in the case of comparative advantage, the value of such socio-spatial differences is assessed in terms of their commodifiability. For example, Bergeron (2003) analyzes how the World Bank incorporates difference into its attempts to create subjects for the market. Taking the case of microfinance, she notes how the Bank, utilizing Putnam’s conception of social capital, takes the position that “developing social capital is best achieved by tapping into the communities’ own ‘premodern’ modes of collaboration and social life” (p. 403). Where such non-capitalist practices are seen as functional to incorporating subjects into microfinance, they are valued. However, social and cultural differences and practices that are not regarded as commodifiable are dismissed as barriers to development, in need of modernization. By the same token, Sachs’ concerns about geographical disadvantage can be regarded as identifying place-based characteristics that cannot be commodified in terms of comparative advantage, e.g., tropical or inland locations, thus requiring intervention. A variety of forces has contributed to the persistence of this imaginary, for at least the last century. First, its power geometry—its rootedness in hegemonic regions of the global system—has given the imaginary particular power to shape not only thinking in the global North, whose self-image it reinforces, but also the global South, whose residents often have been convinced that their own local knowledge and indigenous practices are inadequate. Second, the imaginary gains traction from its optimism and resonance with the notions of progress, equality, and acknowledgement of difference. While each is defined in a particular, commodified way, their capacity to connect with deep human desires for a better life is enticing. Notwithstanding the power and attractiveness of this imaginary, the failure of globalizing capitalism to bring about the prosperity that it promises, combined with the persistence of contestation, has periodically created moments of both material and cognitive crisis. Capitalism’s ability to reinvent itself through such moments of crisis, thereby reinvigorating this imaginary, can be understood through Derrida’s concept of the supplement. [T]he concept of the supplement…harbors within itself two significations whose cohabitation is as strange as it is necessary. The supplement adds itself…, a plenitude enriching another plenitude, the fullest measure of presence… But the supplement supplements. It adds only to replace…; if it fills, it is as one fills a void… As substitute, it is not simply added to the positivity of a presence…, its place is assigned in the structure by the mark of an emptiness. (Derrida, 1976, pp. 144–5) Both Keynesian and Hayekian governance discourses play this supplementary role for capitalism as, arguably, does any global governance discourse. Crises signal the incompleteness of capitalism—marks of an emptiness that require a supplement. Supplements fill capitalism’s emptiness and enrich it, promising a fuller measure of presence. Keynesianism provided exactly this supplement during the Great Depression, filling a gap in capitalism and reinvigorating the socio-spatial imaginary. Hayekian neoliberalism worked similarly when first world Fordism entered its crisis in the later 1970s, only to run into its own difficulties, described above, for which a new supplement is currently being sought. While there is no guarantee that a supplement must emerge to alleviate any crisis, to date this has been the case. 4. Conclusion We have argued that the shifting global governance discourses directed toward the third world since the 1970s can be conceptualized as capitalism’s supplements. As supplements, they have reaffirmed a persistent developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary. Recent discussions of such shifts (e.g., Evans, 2008 and Wade, 2008) invoke Karl Polanyi’s double movement: struggles within nation-states of North Atlantic capitalism, dating back to the 18th century, between those propagating free markets and those seeking to protect society through “powerful institutions designed to check the action of the market relative to labor, land and money” (Polanyi, 2001 [1944], p. 79). The Washington Consensus entailed a shift from the latter to the former pole, albeit at a global scale, generating some nostalgia for national Keynesianism among critical scholars (cf. Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 38). Yet, while new development economics discourses resonate with Keynesian imaginaries, it is doubtful that we are experiencing a return to Polanyi’s institutions, even at a supra-national scale. The decommodification of land, labor and money is not evident, and emergent governance discourses in the US and the UK stress a paternalistic ‘nudging’ of individuals to make the right choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003). Nevertheless neoliberalism, as we know it, is in question. The current crisis has made Hayekian nostrums unpopular, but faith in the market runs deep, and it will probably take a decade before it becomes clear what supplement emerges to manage this crisis. There is no shortage of candidates for post-neoliberal governance regimes—both progressive and regressive (Brand and Sekler, 2009)—and in a moment of crisis, when supplements are in question, contestations can play a vital role in shaping capitalism’s trajectories, and viability. Challenging the developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary, however, will require not just probing the limits of neoliberalism, but exploring imaginaries that exceed capitalism. Within the academy, a plenitude of conceptual alternatives highlight capitalism’s complicity in producing the inequalities and hierarchies that the developmentalist socio-spatial imaginary claims to overcome, including Marxist, world-systemic, feminist, post-colonial and post-developmental scholarship (cf. Sheppard et al., 2009). These alternatives imagine capitalism, development and governance otherwise – seeking more just and sustainable alternatives that create space for variegated trajectories, uneven connectivities and ineluctable difference, instead of stageism, flattening and commodification. Beyond the academy, civil society is expanding the range of alternatives—and is arguably better equipped to disrupt the current experimentations of global policymakers. Experiencing the disabling effects of capitalism and its supplements, those living precariously actively contest neoliberalization, articulating alternative imaginaries and practices through actions ranging from local initiatives to transnational activist networks. The World Social Forum is just the most prominent of innumerable inter-related counter-neoliberal globalization movements (Fisher and Ponniah, 2003, Glassman, 2001, Evans, 2008, Sheppard and Nagar, 2004, Notes From Nowhere, 2003 and Reitan, 2007). Santos (2008, p. 258) regards its gatherings as a productive forum for “alternative thinking of alternatives”—where different kinds of knowledge about social transformation and emancipation, exceeding the hegemonic epistemologies of the West, are valorized and actively debated, and where the existence of alternatives is asserted without defining their content.It may seem unlikely that such emerging alternatives constitute a serious near-term challenge to capitalist imaginaries, but they are provincializing Western understandings of governance and social transformation, and re-politicizing capitalism. Politicization is essential to make space for transformative rather than affirmative remedies, changing the frameworks that generate unequal power relations, and dismantling EuroAmerican centrism “so as to undo the vicious circle of economic and cultural subordination” (Fraser, 1997, p. 28).

### Ptx

#### Next off is politics –

#### Passage likely but not guaranteed – key indicators, new report

KMA, 11-22-2013 <http://www.kmaland.com/ag/fate-of-farm-bill-unclear/article_ee457d16-5382-11e3-b3f1-001a4bcf6878.html>

An informal, end-of-this-week deadline to get a Farm Bill draft approved by a team of congressional negotiators will not be met, throwing into question whether the Farm Bill can be be passed in the House by year’s end. U.S. Ag Secretary Tom Vilsack says congress can act quickly “when there’s a will and there’s a way.”¶ “We have to have a clear indication from congress that this is going to get done,” Vilsack says. “Obviously there are some who are skeptical about that given the fact that we have already seen one year with inaction.”¶ A Farm Bill was due to be passed by this time last year, but congress passed a one-year extension. Vilsack says inaction again this year means his agency will begin instituting the federal farm policies of the 1940s — which are far more costly.¶ “No one wants to do that,” Vilsack says, “and the best and simplest way to avoid it having to be done — at whatever point in time — is to have congress finish its work by the end of the year.”¶ After this week, congress will be in recess for the Thanksgiving holiday. In December, the House will be in session for just two weeks and the Senate for slightly longer before adjourning for the year. Without passage of a five-year Farm Bill, Vilsack says farmers and ranchers are delaying key decisions.¶ “Doesn’t know how to decide whether to expand, to buy an additional piece of equipment because he or she does not know what the programs are going to be,” Vilsack says. “There is no question that farmers have taken a ‘wait and see’ attitude to further decisions that could help spur not only their own operation, but spur the economy generally.”¶ According to a report released Thursday by the White House Council on Economic Advisors, agriculture accounts for nearly five percent of the Gross Domestic Product and one in 12 jobs in the U.S. are in agriculture. Vilsack called it ”a compelling report that makes the argument on a multitude of levels why it’s important for the rest of the country and all of America to see congress finish its work” on the Farm Bill.¶ The chairman of the House Ag Committee emerged from a meeting on Thursday afternoon saying anything is possible, but it “will be challenging” for Farm Bill negotiators to wrap up their work and have a bill ready for a vote in the House by December 13. There are no plans for the House-Senate conference commitee working out the details of a hoped-for Farm Bill compromise to meet today. Senator Tom Harkin and Congressman Steve King serve on the committee, but neither was involved in this week’s negotiations between the four top lawmakers on the panel.

#### PC key—stops long term extension

Huffington Post, 11-5-2013 <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/eva-m-clayton/congressional-and-presidential_b_4221884.html>

Will Congress and the president demonstrate the leadership necessary to enact a strong, but fair Farm Bill that protects our agricultural economy and rural communities? Will it provide a "safety net" for our most vulnerable citizens? Hopefully, the appointed Conferees will seek an opportunity to pass a strong Farm Bill that is fair and helpful to small and large farmers and will enable them to produce healthy and affordable food. The Farm Bill should empower our rural communities to develop and grow economically. Likewise, it must protect and provide food assistance to the millions of Americans in need.¶ The leadership in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate must instruct the Conferees to negotiate in the best interest of the American people. President Obama must be persistent in his leadership by calling on Congress to treat our most vulnerable citizens fairly, protect small and large farmers, and give rural communities an opportunity to grow economically. Another extension of the Farm Bill once again is unacceptable. Farmers and businesses, which have been devastated by the legislative uncertainty, are unable to plan for the next planting season, and cannot do so until Congress acts and the president signs a bill. This delay has hampered assistance for early generation farmers, minority farmers, and the rural small business sector who all suffer disproportionately without a signed bill. ¶ The Fair World Project reports that the majority of farm subsidies are paid to the most profitable companies in the U.S. and "ten percent of farms receive roughly 70 percent of all subsidies." This oversized government benefit reaped by large farms is a major factor in their ability to further expand, leading to increased concentration in the agriculture sector. These subsidies often drive land costs up and small farmers out. Yet, the conversation continues to be focused on cutting the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP). This political gamesmanship puts us again at the crossroads of the "haves and have not's," while too many Americans depend on SNAP for it to be cut in the final bill.¶ The House-passed Farm Bill cut $40 Billion over a ten-year period, mainly by cutting SNAP. The Tea Party and the extreme right wing of the Republican Party might see this as important part of its agenda to "cut spending," but such actions by the House have only resulted in ending 34 years of bipartisan cooperation on food and farm legislation. While Republicans in Congress continue to attack the Food Stamps program as an "easy place" to cut, they fail to recognize the needs of their own constituents and the contribution it provides our economy.¶ Some fail to acknowledge, understand, or care that we had a recession and that Food Stamps were a part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This bill, known as the 'Stimulus Package,' was scheduled to end November 1, 2013 and resulted in millions of people being dropped from the program. According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (CBPP), ending the Recovery Act will reduce benefits to approximately $1.40 per person per meal in 2014. Just think $1.40 per meal! Further, the vast majority of the 47 million SNAP recipients are children, seniors, and adults with disabilities.¶ SNAP can be the bridge between living and survival, dignity and embarrassment. In fact over 900,000 veterans and 5,000 active duty service personnel currently receive food stamps. An example of this hardship was chronicled by the Food and Environment Reporting Network. Steven Johnson, a veteran of the war in Afghanistan, was medically discharged from the military and was unable to find work as a result of his disability. To further complicate matters, there was significant lag time between the end of his military pay and the beginning of his disability benefits. The typical wait time for this benefit is 394 days for active duty veterans, and longer for non-active duty personnel. That is 394 days without a pay check. 394 days without the capacity to feed yourself or your family. To bridge this gap, Johnson relied on food stamps to help feed his family. As veteran Johnson said, "Food Stamps were the last resort we had." This is what is at stake for the Confrees and this President.¶ Unfortunately, there have been anecdotal comments of fraud where "people are trading food stamps for cash." While these instances must be addressed, but it is simply unfair to use these anecdotes to characterize how the law functions. The Department of Agriculture has reported that as few as 1.3 percent of all benefits, were traded at a discount for cash. I agree that fraud is unacceptable concerning all government programs and laws. However, it is amazing how offensive it is for Republicans to use assistance for the poor as a political piñata when fraud persists on Wall Street or among big businesses.¶ The Fair World Project rightly notes that the "Farm Bill is the single most important piece of legislation affecting the food we eat, the kinds of crops American farmers grow, and the environment in which they are grown. The Farm Bill is at the very essence of our nation's food security." This could not be more accurate.¶ The Conferees must put our country first to find success in their negotiations. A strong and fair Farm Bill will require Congressional and presidential leadership. The fate of our nation's food security depends on it.

#### Uncapped guest worker negotiations particularly unpopular – conflicting interests

Nakamura, 13. David Nakamura, staff writer for the Washington Post. “Dispute over guest-worker program puts immigration talks at risk of delay.” http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-03-28/politics/38089703\_1\_guest-worker-program-comprehensive-immigration-reform-barack-obama – clawan

A worsening dispute over a new guest-worker program has emerged as the most serious obstacle to a bipartisan deal on immigration, threatening to delay the unveiling of a Senate bill early next month. The impasse has prompted a bitter round of name-calling between labor and business groups, which accuse each other of imperiling comprehensive immigration reform. The Obama administration has remained on the sidelines as the standoff has worsened, calculating that the president would risk alienating Republican senators crucial to the process. Obama said this week that the issue is “resolvable.” The guest-worker issue helped derail the last serious attempt at reform in 2007 with assistance from Obama, then a U.S. senator from Illinois. The current attempt at reform is being led by a bipartisan group of eight senators, who are attempting to fashion model legislation for a broad immigration overhaul. The dispute centers on rules governing the “future flow” of migrants who come to the United States for menial jobs. Republicans, citing business interests, want to give temporary work visas to up to 400,000 foreign workers a year at low wages. But unions and many Democrats, fearing the effect on U.S. workers, want fewer workers and higher pay under the program. Senators involved insist that they remain on schedule to complete a bill, including a path to citizenship for 11 million illegal immigrants, in early April. Obama also expressed confidence this week that the guest-worker disagreement could be solved. “I don’t agree that it’s threatening to doom the legislation,” Obama said in an interview Wednesday with Telemundo, the Spanish-language TV network. “Labor and businesses may not always agree exactly on how to do this, but this is a resolvable issue.” But behind the scenes, negotiations over the guest-worker program — and the White House’s refusal to take a position — have soured relations between the AFL-CIO and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which a month ago joined hands to publicly proclaim agreement on an overall plan. “Unions say they want a guest-worker program, but their behavior is to the contrary,” said Geoff Burr, the Associated Builders and Contractors’ vice president for federal affairs. “They are insisting on a program that no employer would consider using.”

#### Farm Bill key to stable food prices and farm conservation

John Schlageck, Winfield Courier, 11-14-2013 http://www.winfieldcourier.com/agriculture/article\_20ed67fc-4cc5-11e3-89b4-0019bb2963f4.html

To say the farm bill has moved like molasses through Congress the past three years is a gross understatement. This branch of our federal government continues to be mired in the mud of partisan politics.¶ Congress seems hell-bent on infighting while this nation’s business is left undone. Kansans and other farm-state lawmakers are urging their colleagues to look back to more bipartisan times and do something Congress hasn’t done much of lately – pass a major piece of legislation.¶ Remember the old axiom: politics is the art of compromise?¶ Farm country needs a farm bill and we could have used it yesterday. Much of the fall corn, beans and milo are out of the fields and farmers are ready to look toward 2014 and next year’s crops.¶ Kansas farmers and ranchers need the certainty of a completed farm bill in order to make business decisions for next year, says Kansas Farm Bureau President Steve Baccus, an Ottawa County farmer.¶ A strong, affordable crop insurance safety net will help producers develop individual risk management plans, he adds. Reauthorizing livestock disaster programs will protect Kansas ranchers from catastrophic losses such as those suffered by South Dakota ranchers after the recent blizzard.¶ Baccus urged Congress to fund all titles in the new farm bill to avoid abandoning important conservation, research and trade programs to the mercy of the appropriations process. He also called on lawmakers to preserve traditional rural-urban cooperation on nutrition issues.¶ “A farm bill without a meaningful nutrition title will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the House and Senate to reach agreement on a bill that can be signed by the president,” Baccus said. “Congress must pass a unified farm bill that continues the partnership between the nutrition and farm communities and their constituents.”¶ Seems the main challenge in arriving at a new farm bill is the differences on food stamps, officially called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).¶ The House has passed legislation to slash approximately $40 billion annually, or about five percent, including changes in eligibility and work requirements. The Senate wants to cut a much smaller $4 billion.¶ SNAP funding has more than doubled during the past five years as the nation’s economy struggled. Democrats contend it is working as intended, providing food to those in need when times are tough. Republicans believe it should be focused on the neediest people.¶ When most Americans think of a farm bill they think of farm subsidies. Few think of all the other things that are covered in this nearly $1 trillion program.¶ Few Americans know that 75 percent of the farm bill is actually helping feed folks who need nutrition assistance. Let me repeat, 75 percent of this bill goes to feed hungry people.¶ Most of the current law’s ag provisions expired in September. Direct payments would have been eliminated and our lawmakers could have taken some of that money applied it to deficit reduction as well as an affordable crop insurance program.¶ If we don’t have a farm bill by 2014 and Congress allows dairy supports to expire, 1930s and 1940s-era farm law would kick in. Some estimates conclude the government will then pay up to four times more for dairy products. If that scenario plays out, many farmers would sell to the government instead of commercial markets, decreasing the commercial supply while raising prices for shoppers at the supermarket

#### Conservation cuts crush biodiversity and causes extinction

\*Causes pesticide use

Clark 6 (Dana, Adjunct Professor – The American University's Washington College of Law, & David Downes, Senior Trade Advisor in the Office of the Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, adjunct faculty of the American University's Washington College of Law, 12-29, http://www.ciel.org/Publications/summary.html)

Biodiversity is the diversity of life on earth, on which we depend for our survival. The variability of and within species and ecosystems helps provide some of our basic needs: food, shelter, and medicine, as well as recreational, cultural, spiritual and aesthetic benefits. Diverse ecosystems create the air we breathe, enrich the soil we till and purify the water we drink. Ecosystems also regulate local and global climate. No one can seriously argue that biodiversity is not valuable. Nor can anyone seriously argue that biodiversity is not at risk. There are over 900 domestic species listed as threatened or endangered under the Endangered Species Act, and 4,000 additional species are candidates for listing. We are losing species as a result of human activities at hundreds of times the natural rate of extinction. The current rate of extinction is the highest since the mass extinction of species that wiped out the dinosaurs millions of years ago. The Economics of Biodiversity Conservation The question which engenders serious controversy is whether society can afford the costs associated with saving biodiversity. Opponents of biodiversity conservation argue that the costs of protecting endangered species are too high. They complain that the regulatory burden on private landowners is too heavy, and that conservation measures impede development. They seek to override scientific determinations with economic considerations, and to impose cost/benefit analyses on biodiversity policy making. An equally important question, however, is whether we can afford not to save biodiversity. The consequences of losing this critical resource could be devastating. As we destroy species and habitat, we endanger food supplies (such as crop varieties that impart resistance to disease, or the loss of spawning grounds for fish and shellfish); we lose the opportunity to develop new medicines or other chemicals; and we impair critical ecosystem functions that protect our water supplies, create the air we breathe, regulate climate and shelter us from storms. We lose creatures of cultural importance - the bald eagle is an example of the cultural significance of biodiversity and also of the need for strong regulations to protect species from extinction. And, we lose the opportunity for mental or spiritual rejuvenation through contact with nature. There are many other costs associated with the loss of biodiversity, and other values associated with its preservation. Researchers are finding that protection of ecosystems rich in biodiversity can strengthen and diversify regional economies. For example, the estimated economic value of intact natural forests for recreation, production of fish and wildlife, and other benefits, is one-third to three times as much as their value for timber alone, according to the World Resources Institute. These are significant costs and benefits which should be included in any economic analysis of biodiversity conservation. Much of the current controversy stems from private landowners who resent government regulation of their lands. Government regulation is necessary to protect a critical public resource from private destruction. However, individual citizens should not bear the full cost of protecting biodiversity, since their actions benefit society at large. Within the context of a strong regulatory framework with defined conservation goals, economic incentives can help defuse political controversy by providing increased flexibility and rewarding private sector conservation efforts. Conservation strategies must be developed that make private landowners willing partners in biodiversity conservation. This is particularly important given that seventy percent of U.S. land outside of Alaska is privately owned. Even more significantly, more than fifty percent of species listed under the Endangered Species Act are found only on private lands, and many more have substantial parts of their remaining range on private property. In many cases, reforms to benefit biodiversity will require the revision of existing incentives offered to the private sector by government policies. In many cases, economic policies send signals which conflict with the goal of species conservation. If biodiversity considerations are linked to the economic incentive, the signal sent to the private sector is harmonized rather than conflicting. Private landowners benefit from public assistance in many ways. These benefits include subsidized access to vital resources like water and roadways, price supports, and tax breaks, all of which increase the value of property. For example, the American Farm Bureau Federation has estimated that farm support payments have increased the value of farmland in this country by $250 billion. Public support could be conditioned upon requiring recipients to comply with existing laws and to implement management practices that embody sound principles of land stewardship. In order to fully integrate economic and environmental policy, we must also examine the biodiversity impact of government subsidies. Government subsidies often stimulate or encourage activities that damage biodiversity. Tax breaks for extractive industries are a prime example of this problem. In addition, agricultural policies have a dramatic effect on land use in the United States. As currently structured, farm support programs provide perverse incentives that contribute to soil erosion, overuse of agricultural chemicals, and loss of wildlife habitat. Commodity price support programs are tied to production levels. At the same time, acreage reduction programs restrict the amount of acreage that can be planted. These policies work together to encourage intensive cropping and high levels of chemical inputs on land that is planted, in order to boost production and maximize the government subsidy. These negative effects of agriculture policy could be ameliorated by removing the perverse incentives, linking support to best management practices and purchasing conservation easements to keep certain lands out of agricultural production.

### CP

#### Next off is the CP –

[go slow]

#### Text: The United States Federal Government should expand the Life-Line and Link-Up program (as offered under the Federal Communication Commission’s Universal Services Fund) to include broadband services. The United States Federal Government should substantially increase funding for research and development of labor-saving and robotic harvesting machines, research and development of labor-aids, and provide loan guarantees & grants to allow small or vulnerable farmers to purchase new equipment and reorganize their operations.

#### Increased federal funding jumpstarts the transition to mechanization – solves small farms

Krikorian 1 (Mark Krikorian, executive director of the Center for Immigration Studies and a Visiting Fellow at the Nixon Center, 7/22/01, It's a Mistake to Depend on Foreign Labor: An Analyst's View, Idaho Statesman, http://www.cis.org/ForeignLaborDependency)

At the same time, past federal policies have encouraged dependence on Mexican labor, especially by our fruit and vegetable farmers. So imperative as it is to cut illegal immigration and reject guestworker programs, we owe it to farmers in Idaho and across the country to offer them an alternative to the current way of doing business. Fortunately, such an alternative is readily available, if only we reverse an ill-advised policy from the past. On Dec. 13, 1979, Carter administration Agriculture Secretary Bob Bergland announced, "I will not put federal money into any project that results in saving of farm labor." At the same time, he backed a lawsuit by California Rural Legal Assistance against the University of California to prevent it from using any tax money to develop harvest mechanization technologies. But the case of fruit and vegetable farming calls for a transitional federal partnership with private industry - the government fostered farmers' dependence on alien labor, through past guest worker programs, amnesties, and lack of immigration enforcement, so it is Washington's responsibility to help farmers extricate themselves from the

bill funding geared toward a revived effort at mechanization of fruit and vegetable harvesting. Such a program would have several components: \* Research and development of labor-saving machines and robotic harvesting - European producers are far ahead of us in developing cutting-edge robotic technologies for agriculture, precisely because they don't have the same mass access to cheap labor. There are huge gains to be made in citrus, lettuce, apples, and other crops. \* Research and development of "labor-aids" - technologies which don't reduce the need for workers but which make the work easier to perform. This would address widespread concerns about occupational injuries among farmworkers and allay the fears of those who contend that mechanization would be bad for farmworkers. But it also would help farmers, by effectively increasing the number of potential workers, since more people would be capable of performing the work. \* Finally, it would be necessary to offer loan guarantees to enable smaller family farmers to be able to purchase the new equipment or reorganize their operations to increase harvest productivity. Otherwise, large, better-capitalized operations would be able to take advantage of these new technologies developed with taxpayer funds to squeeze their smaller competitors. The dependence of our horticultural sector on foreign labor is a genuine problem - but Sen. Craig's solution would only spawn new difficulties. Helping agriculture disentangle itself from foreign labor would strengthen the competitive position of America's farmers, avoid burdening taxpayers with huge new liabilities, and lighten the load of those who continue to toil in the fields.

organic as the farming operation in which human labor is employed for weed control.

benefit industrial food production, and not organic.”

#### Expanding Broadband access is vital to the US economy – boosts innovation and competitiveness

Bleha ‘5 (Mr. Thomas Bleha is an Associate of Global Business Access , Ltd. and a member of the firm's Asia Experts Group. During a distinguished career in the U.S. Foreign Service , Mr. Bleha specialized in policy issue related to Japan. Foreign Affairs, “Down to the Wire,” Pg. 111 Vol. 84 No. 3, May 2005 - June 2005)

The United States is losing considerable ground to Japan and its neighbors, and they will be the first to reap the economic benefits of these technologies. It is these countries, rather than the United States, that will benefit from the enhanced productivity, economic growth, and new jobs that high-speed broadband will bring. In 2001, Robert Crandall, an economist at the Brookings Institution, and Charles Jackson, a telecommunications consultant, estimated that "widespread" adoption of basic broadband in the United States could add $500 billion to the U.S. economy and produce 1.2 million new jobs. But Washington never promoted such a policy. Last year, another Brookings economist, Charles Ferguson, argued that perhaps as much as $1 trillion might be lost over the next decade due to present constraints on broadband development. These losses, moreover, are only the economic costs of the United States' indirection. They do not take into account the work that could have been done through telecommuting, the medical care or interactive long-distance education that might have been provided in remote areas, and unexploited entertainment possibilities. The large broadband-user markets of Northeast Asia will attract the innovation the United States once enjoyed. Asians will have the first crack at developing the new commercial applications, products, services, and content of the high-speed-broadband era. Although many large U.S. firms, such as Cisco, IBM, and Microsoft, are closely following developments overseas and are unlikely to be left behind, the United States' medium-sized and smaller firms, which tend to foster the most innovation, may well be. The Japanese and the South Koreans will also be the first to enjoy the quality-of-life benefits that the high-speed-broadband era will bring. These will include not only Internet telephones and videophones, but also easy teleconferencing, practical telecommuting, remote diagnosis and medical services, interactive distance education, rich multimedia entertainment, digitally controlled home appliances, and much more.Given these costs and losses, it is clear that broadband is critically important to the U.S. economy and the United States' international competitiveness and that it must become a national priority. In the run-up to the election in November, President Bush finally addressed the issue, promising the electorate "universal, affordable access" to broadband technology by 2007 and "plenty" of carriers to choose from "as soon as possible thereafter." To reach these goals, he expressed confidence in new broadband service over power lines, promising wireless technologies, such as WiFi hotspots and longer-distance WiMax, and unspecified tax credits.

#### This form of competitiveness is vital to the US’s technological leadership

Rintels ‘8 (Jonathan Rintels is the Executive Director of the Center for Creative Voices in Media, a nonprofit organization – An Action Plan for America Using Technology and innovation to address our nation’s critical challenges https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/11811/Benton\_Foundation\_Action\_Plan.pdf?sequence=1)

This troubling trend will not reverse itself soon. America’s global competitors are executing well-conceived and -financed national strategies to dramatically increase their competitive advantage in broadband over the United States, which has no national broadband strategy. In the 21st-century global economy made “flat” by broadband, in Thomas Friedman’s well-turned phrase, our nation faces a serious challenge to its global technological leadership, as well as its economic competitiveness. As many nations boldly strategize their rapid advance into the Digital Age by energetically embracing and exploiting the potential of broadband, America is being left behind. This challenge, every bit as serious as that which we faced in 1957 when the Soviet Union launched the first satellite into space, is our nation’s “new Sputnik moment.” Without strong federal leadership on the deployment of universal, affordable, and robust broadband, the broadband- enabled, Digital Age “American Dream” that other nations’ citizens are already beginning to enjoy remains to Americans just a dream. Failing to deploy universal, affordable, and robust broadband denies a wealth of tangible economic and quality-of-life benefits to our citizens, including: • Hundreds of Billions of Dollars in New Economic Development • Over a Million New, High-Paying Jobs • Increased Homeland Security and Public Safety • Better Health Care at Lower Cost • Enhanced Educational Opportunities • Reduced Energy Consumption and Greenhouse Gas Emissions • Reinvigorated Democracy and Government To provide these essential benefits to Americans, and to answer the challenge of our nation’s new Sputnik moment, the new Administration must launch a well-planned, concerted national effort – paralleling that which deployed telephone service, electricity, and interstate highways across the nation – to deploy robust and affordable broadband to every corner of our nation.

#### This is crucial to US hegemony

Ferguson ‘2 (Charles H. Ferguson is a Nonresident Senior Fellow, for Economic Studies at the Brookings Institution. Dr. Ferguson is also a member of the Council on Foreign Relations, “The U.S. Broadband Problem,” Brookings Policy Brief #101, July 2002, http://www.brookings.edu/papers/2002/07technology\_ferguson.aspx)

There is strong evidence that the Internet has played a major role in the productivity revival experienced by the United States since the early 1990s. Productivity growth and military power are now driven primarily by information systems, which are becoming heavily Internet-dependent. As digital technology continues its progress, the broadband problem is becoming a major bottleneck in the U.S. and world economy. If allowed to persist, the broadband bottleneck will also cause "digital divide" problems, which arise when unequal access to Internet services is thought to contribute to widening inequalities in income, wealth, and power. However, computers are not the problem: the computer industry is highly competitive, and the inherent tendency of technology is to democratize access. Indeed, the computer industry is now being reshaped by palmtop, game, and consumer-oriented systems costing only a few hundred dollars, some of which already have more processing power than personal computers built in 1990. However, at current prices, one year of ADSL costs as much as a home computer, and one year of T1 service costs as much as five office computers. Improved broadband services would support globalization and political freedom. China and other nations, for example, have been forced to permit increasingly widespread Internet use. They will be forced to permit broadband services, despite the fact that for technical reasons they are more difficult to censor than conventional email or web pages. And finally, local broadband deployment has significant interactions with energy, environmental, and national security policy. Nations increasingly need to maintain economic growth without increasing energy use, greenhouse emissions, and pollution. One response is to substitute communication for physical transportation via use of digital documents, videoconferencing, and so forth. However, large-scale broadband deployment is required to realize these gains. And finally, local broadband policy also has significant national security implications. U.S. national security and military power depend upon communications and information technology, whose performance is now driven by commercial markets, with military products following years later. Moreover, the widespread availability of broadband services for surveillance, videoconferencing, and other applications would directly increase the capabilities of law enforcement, medical, and national security authorities.

### Ag

#### Alt causes to ag worker shortage- aging crisis, Mexican economy improving and lack of interest in farm work – THEIR AP EV

AP 13 ( Associated Press, 3/11/13 “California farms face labor shortage as farmworkers age”http:www.mercurynews.com/ci\_22764267/ MB accessed 11/3/13)

California's $44 billion agricultural industry faces a worsening labor shortage as farmworkers age, more return home to Mexico and fewer new migrants arrive to replace them.¶ The state's farming workforce is aging and shrinking for several reasons, including stricter immigration enforcement, an improving economy in Mexico and the lack of interest in field work among the children of farmworkers, according to the Sacramento Bee (http://bit.ly/ZC3Q0j ).¶ ---their card starts---¶ "Basically, we're running out of low-skilled workers," said J. Edward Taylor, a University of California, Davis, economist who has studied the migration of farmworkers from Mexico. "The second generation doesn't do farm work. That's why we've relied on a steady influx of newcomers. And the newcomers are in dwindling supply."¶ More than 70 percent of state agricultural producers expect a worker shortage starting this spring and worsening through the growing season, according to the California Farm Bureau Federation.¶ Lawmakers and farm lobbyists are discussing remedies, including granting legal status to more than 1 million undocumented farmworkers and expanding the number of visas for agriculture.¶ "We have to try to find a system that is not going to cause a major disruption to our industry," said Bryan Little, the farm bureau's director of labor affairs.¶ Manuel Cunha Jr., president of the Nisei Farmers League, representing 1,100 farms and other agriculture outlets, said his group's workforce fell by 20 to 30 percent during last year's harvest season. By September, some farm crews were as much as 60 percent short of the workers they needed.¶ Cunha blamed increased farm audits by federal immigration officials and the increasing dangers of crossing the border from Mexico.¶ "Workers were leaving agriculture because they were fearful of the audits and getting busted," Cunha said. "And then, when they went home, they realized it wasn't worth it to return because of the drug traffickers and human traffickers."¶ ---their card ends---¶ The declining number of farmworkers is prompting some growers to switch to crops that require less labor.¶ Chandler Farms, about 40 miles southeast of Fresno, decided to cut back on peaches and plums and use more land to grow almonds, which can be harvested by machine.¶ "I don't know if it is going to get better for a while," said Bill Chandler, who runs the family ranch in Selma with his son. "If you want peaches or plums, or strawberries or lettuce or tomatoes, we need a program in which we can have labor. I don't have the answers."¶ Arcadio Castro, a foreman at the Chandler ranch, said workers in his Mexican hometown of Zacatecas can't afford to pay a "coyote" to smuggle them across the border and prefer construction jobs in urban areas.¶ So Castro, 59, has depends on veteran laborers willing to do work many of their children won't consider.¶ "You're not going to believe me, but the older workers are better," Castro said. "They go slower, but they work all day long. The younger ones start complaining. They say, 'Oh, it's so hot.' Then they climb up a ladder and start texting."

#### Status quo solves better than the aff – already uncapped and streamlining is key – THEIR CLEMENS EV

Clemens 13 (Michael A. Clemens, May 5,2013. Clemens has a PHD from Harvard in Economics and is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Development where he leads the Migration and Development initiative. “INTERNATIONAL HARVEST: A Case Study of How Foreign Workers Help American Farms Grow Crops – and the Economy”. http://www.renewoureconomy.org/sites/all/themes/pnae/nc-agr-report-05-2013.pdf; MB Accessed 11/13/13)

Recommendations

The number of agricultural guest worker visas should remain¶ uncapped or be flexible enough to meet farmers’ labor needs.¶ Although the current H-2A visa is uncapped, some proposed legislation would¶ set an annual cap on agricultural guest workers. If instated, any limit on the¶ visas must reflect labor market realities – in North Carolina, native workers¶ filled just one-tenth of one percent of farms’ labor needs. Any temporary visa¶ program should provide sufficient workers to meet the remaining 99.9 percent¶ of job openings.¶ The number of agricultural worker visas should not depend on local¶ or national unemployment rates. Some proposed legislation would make¶ visas for guest workers available only below a certain unemployment rate. Yet¶ even when unemployment more than doubled in North Carolina, there was just¶ a slight increase in applications, and no change in the number of workers who¶ completed the season.¶ Requirements to protect American workers should be modernized¶ and streamlined. The recruiting requirements for US workers should be¶ preserved, but should be streamlined so that the cost of recruiting – and¶ accompanying documentation – does not exceed the values of the jobs.¶ Eliminating the expense of newspaper advertisements and relying on the more¶ targeted electronic and mail outreach efforts by state labor agencies would¶ cut recruiters’ costs.¶ The guest worker program should have the flexibility needed by¶ agriculture’s employers and employees. The H-2A program requires¶ employers to apply months in advance for a set number of workers to come¶ for set dates. Yet the needs of planting and harvest depend on climate and¶ weather. Farmers should be certified and allowed to hire the guest workers as¶ needed, and guest workers should be free to work for any certified farmer who¶ has job openings.

#### Alt cause to ag collapse—Bee shortages prevent pollination

Grossman 13

(Elizabeth, Public Policy Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Declining Bee Populations Pose

A Threat to Global Agriculture” pg online at http://e360.yale.edu/feature/declining\_bee\_populations\_pose\_a\_threat\_to\_global\_agriculture/2645///sd)

One of every three bites of food eaten worldwide depends on pollinators, especially bees, for a successful harvest. And in the past several months, a scramble in California’s almond groves has given the world a taste of what may lie in store for food production if the widespread — and still puzzling — decimation of bee colonies continues. For much of the past 10 years, beekeepers, primarily in the United States and Europe, have been reporting annual hive losses of 30 percent or higher, substantially more than is considered normal or sustainable. But this winter, many U.S. beekeepers experienced losses of 40 to 50 percent or more, just as commercial bee operations prepared to transport their hives for the country’s largest pollinator event: the fertilizing of California’s almond trees. Spread across 800,000 acres, California’s almond orchards typically require 1.6 million domesticated bee colonies to pollinate the flowering trees and produce what has become the state’s largest overseas agricultural export. But given the widespread bee losses to so-called “colony collapse disorder” this winter, California’s almond growers were able to pollinate their crop only through an intense, nationwide push to cobble together the ‘In the long run, if we don't find some answers, we could lose a lot of bees,’ says one expert. necessary number of healthy bee colonies. “Other crops don’t need as many bees as the California almond orchards do, so shortages are not yet apparent, but if trends continue, there will be,” said Tim Tucker, vice-president of the American Beekeeping Federation and owner of Tuckerbees Honey in Kansas, which lost 50 percent of its hives this past winter. “Current [bee] losses are not sustainable. The trend is down, as is the quality of bees. In the long run, if we don’t find some answers, and the vigor continues to decline, we could lose a lot of bees.” The gravity of the situation was underscored on Monday, when the European Commission (EC) said it intended to impose a two-year ban on a class of pesticides known as neonicotinoids, now the world’s most widely used type of insecticide. Neonicotinoids are one of the leading suspected causes of colony collapse disorder, and the European Commission announced its controversial decision three months after the European Food Safety Agency concluded that the pesticides represented a “high acute risk” to honeybees and other pollinators. The EC action will restrict the use of three major neonicitinoids on seeds and plants attractive to bees, as well as grains, beginning December 1. “I pledge to my utmost to ensure that our bees, which are so vital to our ecosystem and contribute over 22 billion Euros [$29 billion] annually to European agriculture, are protected,” said European Union Health Commissioner Tonio Borg. The EC action comes as scientists and regulators have grown increasingly concerned about the impact of colony collapse disorder on the world’s food supply, given that the majority of the planet’s 100 most important food crops depend on insect pollination. A recent international study of 41 crop systems on six continents showed that healthy populations of wild bees are key to successful yields of crops ranging from pumpkins to grapefruit. Relying solely on domesticated honeybees could ultimately put those crops at risk, scientists say. Wild bees also have been declining in many places. No one investigating the issue is suggesting that neonicotinoids are the sole cause of current bee declines. Tucker, other beekeepers, and entomologists say that the cause of colony collapse disorder is likely a combination of factors that includes the widespread use of pesticides and fungicides, as well as the spread of viral pathogens and parasitic mites in beehives. While mites and diseases have long been known to cause significant declines in domesticated bee populations, no single pathogen or parasite, say entomologists, appears to sufficiently explain the current rate of hive collapse. A recent study that found unprecedented levels of agricultural pesticides — some at toxic levels — in honeybee colonies is prompting entomologists to look more closely at the role of neonicotinoids in current bee declines. No one is suggesting that neonicotinoids are the sole cause of current bee declines. Some studies have indicated that neonicotinoids can lead to a sharp decline in queen bees in colonies and can also interfere with the ability of bees to navigate back to their hives. James Frazier, a professor of entomology at Pennsylvania State University, said more research needs to be conducted into whether neonicotinoids, particularly in combination with other pesticides, may suppress the immune system of bees at “sub-lethal” levels, enabling diseases to take hold. “This is uncharted territory,” said Purdue University associate professor of entomology Christian Krupke. “We’ve never done pest management like this before.” While not downplaying neonicotinoids as a potential culprit, Eric Mussen, an apiculturiust at the University of California, Davis, noted that the case against these pesticides is not clear-cut. For example, honeybees are apparently doing fine in Australia, where neonicotinoids are widely used and varroa mites are not a problem. Neonicotinoid use is common in Canada, but colony collapse disorder is not significantly affecting hives there. University of California Honeybees are brought in to pollinate onion crops at a California farm. In the U.S., several national environmental advocacy organizations and commercial beekeepers filed suit in March against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for its conditional registration of certain neonicotinoids, contending that the agency did not properly ensure environmental health protections, particularly with respect to pollinators. The EPA is now reviewing its registration of neonicotinoids and has accelerated the review schedule due “to uncertainties about these pesticides and their potential effects on bees.” The agency said in an email that it is working with beekeepers, growers, pesticide manufacturers, and others to improve pesticide use, labeling, and management practices to protect bees and to thoroughly evaluate the effects of pesticides on honeybees and other pollinators. As part of these efforts, the EPA is working with pesticide and agricultural equipment manufacturers to reduce the release of neonicotinoid-contaminated dust during planting — a time when commercial bees are likely to encounter the insecticide. In the U.S., neonicotinoids are currently used on about 95 percent of corn and canola crops; the majority of cotton, sorghum, and sugar beets; and about half of all soybeans. They’re also used on the vast majority of fruit and vegetable crops, including apples, cherries, peaches, oranges, berries, leafy greens, tomatoes, and potatoes. Neonicotinoids are also applied to cereal grains, rice, nuts, and wine grapes. Charles Benbrook, research professor at Washington State University’s Center for Sustaining Agriculture and Natural Resources, has estimated that neonicotinoids are used on approximately 75 percent of the acres devoted to these crops in the U.S. They are also widely used on landscaping plants and urban trees and in numerous home garden pest-control products — all in places frequented by bees, domesticated and wild. “There is no place to go hide,” says New York beekeeper Jim Doan, a director of the American Beekeeping Federation. “The outlook is not good.”

#### Food prices won’t cause instability

**WFP 2012**

(World Food Program, “High Food Prices: Why This Is Different From 2008”, 9-4, <http://www.wfp.org/stories/high-food-prices-why-different-2008>, ldg)

1. Global stocks of rice and wheat are higher than they were in 2008. The price and supplies of rice, a staple food for many millions of people, are relatively stable in Asia. 2. In 2008, several major food-producing countries imposed export bans, which caused shortages on world markets. Meanwhile, in food-deficit countries, there was panic-buying, with governments paying very high prices, especially for rice. So far this time this has not happened. 3. In contrast to 2008, global economic growth is presently weak, so demand is not pushing prices further upwards. 4. Many countries are better prepared to face the current situation. Some have worked on establishing and improving social safety nets such as school meals, and public works programmes. 5. Better tools exist at the international level to coordinate the policy response. For example, in 2011 the G20 set up the Agricultural Market Information System (AMIS), hosted at FAO, which tracks food commodity markets and aims to improve transparency and act as an early warning system.

#### No Pakistan collapse and it doesn't escalate

**Dasgupta, Brooking senior fellow, 2013**

(Sunil, “How will India respond to civil war in Pakistan?”, 2-25, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/02/25/how-will-india-respond-to-civil-war-in-pakistan/>, ldg)

As it is, India and Pakistan have gone down to the nuclear edge four times — in 1986, 1990, 1999 and 2001–02. In each case, India responded in a manner that did not escalate the conflict. Any incursion into Pakistan was extremely limited. An Indian intervention in a civil war in Pakistan would be subject to the same limitations — at least so long as the Pakistani army maintains its integrity. Given the new US–India ties, the most important factor in determining the possibility and nature of Indian intervention in a possible Pakistani civil war is Washington. If the United States is able to get Kabul and Islamabad to work together against the Taliban, as it is trying to do now, then India is likely to continue its current policy or try to preserve some influence in Afghanistan, especially working with elements of the Northern Alliance. India and Afghanistan already have a strategic partnership agreement in place that creates the framework for their bilateral relationship to grow, but the degree of actual cooperation will depend on how Pakistan and the Taliban react. If Indian interests in Afghanistan come under attack, New Delhi might have to pull back. The Indian government has been quite clear about not sending troops to Afghanistan. If the United States shifts its policy to where it has to choose Kabul over Islamabad, in effect reviving the demand for an independent Pashtunistan, India is likely to be much more supportive of US and Afghan goals. The policy shift, however, carries the risk of a full-fledged proxy war with Pakistan in Afghanistan, but should not involve the prospect of a direct Indian intervention in Pakistan itself. India is not likely to initiate an intervention that causes the Pakistani state to fail. Bill Keller of the New York Times has described Pakistani president Asif Ail Zardari as overseeing ‘a ruinous kleptocracy that is spiraling deeper into economic crisis’. But in contrast to predictions of an unravelling nation, British journalist-scholar Anatol Lieven argues that the Pakistani state is likely to continue muddling through its many problems, unable to resolve them but equally predisposed against civil war and consequent state collapse. Lieven finds that the strong bonds of family, clan, tribe and the nature of South Asian Islam prevent modernist movements — propounded by the government or by the radicals — from taking control of the entire country. Lieven’s analysis is more persuasive than the widespread view that Pakistan is about to fail as a state. The formal institutions of the Pakistani state are surprisingly robust given the structural conditions in which they operate. Indian political leaders recognise Pakistan’s resilience. Given the bad choices in Pakistan, they would rather not have anything to do with it. If there is going to be a civil war, why not wait for the two sides to exhaust themselves before thinking about intervening? The 1971 war demonstrated India’s willingness to exploit conditions inside Pakistan, but to break from tradition requires strong, countervailing logic, and those elements do not yet exist. Given the current conditions and those in the foreseeable future, India is likely to sit out a Pakistani civil war while covertly coordinating policy with the United States.

**[If time]No resource wars or conflict over scarcity**

**Tetrais 12**, Senior Fellow at Foundation for Strategic Research, (Bruno- Editorial Board at TWQ, July, “The Demise of Ares: The End of War as We Know It?” The Washington Quarterly, Vol 35 Issue 3, p 7-22, T&F Online)

**The invasion of Kuwait may go down in history as being the last great resource war**. **Future resource wars are unlikely**. There are fewer and fewer conquest wars. Between the Westphalia peace and the end of World War II, nearly half of conflicts were fought over territory. Since the end of the Cold War, it has been less than 30 percent.61 The invasion of Kuwait—a nationwide bank robbery—may go down in history as being the last great resource war. The U.S.-led intervention of 1991 was partly driven by the need to maintain the free flow of oil, but not by the temptation to capture it. (Nor was the 2003 war against Iraq motivated by oil.) As for the current tensions between the two Sudans over oil, they are the remnants of a civil war and an offshoot of a botched secession process, not a desire to control new resources.¶ China's and India's energy needs are sometimes seen with apprehension: in light of growing oil and gas scarcity, is there not a risk of military clashes over the control of such resources? This seemingly consensual idea rests on two fallacies. One is that there is such a thing as oil and gas scarcity, a notion challenged by many energy experts.62 As prices rise, previously untapped reserves and non-conventional hydrocarbons become economically attractive. The other is that spilling blood is a rational way to access resources. As shown by the work of historians and political scientists such as Quincy Wright, the economic rationale for war has always been overstated. And because of globalization, it has become cheaper to buy than to steal. We no longer live in the world of 1941, when fear of lacking oil and raw materials was a key motivation for Japan's decision to go to war. In an era of liberalizing trade, many natural resources are fungible goods. (Here, Beijing behaves as any other actor: 90 percent of the oil its companies produce outside of China goes to the global market, not to the domestic one.)63 There may be clashes or conflicts in regions in maritime resource-rich areas such as the South China and East China seas or the Mediterranean, but they will be driven by nationalist passions, not the desperate hunger for hydrocarbons.¶ Only in civil wars does the question of resources such as oil, diamonds, minerals, and the like play a significant role; this was especially true as Cold War superpowers stopped their financial patronage of local actors.64 Indeed, as Mueller puts it in his appropriately titled The Remnants of War, “Many [existing wars] have been labeled ‘new war,’ ‘ethnic conflict,’ or, most grandly ‘clashes of civilization.’ But in fact, most…are more nearly opportunistic predation by packs, often remarkably small ones, of criminals, bandits, and thugs.”65 It is the abundance of resources, not their scarcity, which fuels such conflicts. The risk is particularly high when the export of natural resources represents at least a third of the country's GDP.66¶ What about fighting for arable land, in light of population growth in Africa and Asia? Even in situations of high population densities, the correlation between the lack of arable lands and propensity to collective violence remains weak.67 Neo-Malthusians such as Jared Diamond believe that the Rwanda tragedy was driven by such scarcity.68 But there was no famine in Rwanda at the time. And the events of 1994 were not a revolt of the poor: Hutu landowners were amongst the most active perpetrators of genocide. There was, however, a significant youth bulge: the 15–24 age group represented 38 percent of the adult population.69 Land scarcity played a role, but at best as a factor explaining the intensity of the violence in some areas.70

### Manufacturing

#### U.S. manufacturing is resurgent---slew of factors make it sustainable and immune to a double-dip

**PWS 2012**

(Pricewaterhouse Coopers, “A Homecoming For U.S. Manufacturing?”, 9-21, http://www.manufacturing.net/articles/2012/09/a-homecoming-for-us-manufacturing?et\_cid=2861124&et\_rid=279915960&linkid=http%3a%2f%2fwww.manufacturing.net%2farticles%2f2012%2f09%2fa-homecoming-for-us-manufacturing, ldg)

NEW YORK― Consensus views on a U.S. manufacturing resurgence have largely centered on rising labor costs in markets such as China as the key driver of re-shoring back to the U.S. However, a new PwC US report, A Homecoming for U.S. Manufacturing?, reveals that while rising labor costs are part of the story, a range of factors—including transportation and energy costs and protecting the supply chain—could drive a sustained manufacturing renaissance in the U.S. beyond any cyclical recovery, potentially improving investment, employment, production output and research & development (R&D). PwC’s new report identifies seven factors—including transportation and energy costs; currency fluctuations; U.S. market demand; labor costs; U.S. talent; availability of capital; and the tax and regulatory climate—as the primary catalysts influencing manufacturers' decisions to establish production facilities domestically and produce products closer to their major customer bases. PwC's report also notes that localizing production can mitigate supply chain disruptions, which totaled $2.2 billion in financial impact for U.S. industrial products companies in 2011. “The reviving industrial manufacturing sector is instrumental to U.S. economic recovery,” said Bob McCutcheon, PwC’s U.S. Industrial Products leader. “Beyond the cyclical rebound, however, a host of structural changes is emerging that may lead to the U.S. becoming an important location for basing production and R&D facilities for several industries. In addition to trends in labor costs, other factors include the need to reduce transportation and energy costs; the emergence of the U.S. as a more attractive exporter and the relative attractiveness of the U.S. markets.”

#### [if time] Manufacturing High – defer to statistics and recency

Wire reports 9-4 [[Wire Report, The Spokesman Review, trusted news source, Author of “Manufacturing pace hits two-year high,” http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2013/sep/04/manufacturing-pace-hits-two-year-high/](file:///E%3A%5CWire%20Report%2C%20The%20Spokesman%20Review%2C%20trusted%20news%20source%2C%20Author%20of), Published September 4th, 2013]

WASHINGTON – U.S. factories expanded last month at the fastest pace since June 2011 on a jump in orders. The report signals that manufacturing output could strengthen in coming months.¶ ¶ The Institute for Supply Management said its manufacturing index rose to 55.7 in August from 55.4 in July. That topped the index’s 12-month average of 52. A reading above 50 indicates growth. The ISM is a trade group of purchasing managers.¶ ¶ A gauge of new orders rose nearly five points to 63.2, the highest level in more than two years. Production increased but more slowly than in the previous month.

#### Economic collapse doesn’t cause war

**Bazzi et al., UCSD economics department, 2011**

(Samuel, “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”, November, <http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4>, ldg)

VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20

#### [If time]Economy resilient-overwhelming number of indicators prove

**Gross, Newsweek global business editor, 2012**

(Daniel, “Myth Of Decline: U.S. Is Stronger and Faster Than Anywhere Else”, 4-30, <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2012/04/29/myth-of-decline-u-s-is-stronger-and-faster-than-anywhere-else.html>, ldg)

The U.S. remains the largest, richest, most secure market in the world, full of valuable resources. That’s why it continues to lead the world in foreign direct investment (FDI). In 2010, FDI rose to $194.5 billion from $135 billion in 2009, and stood at $155 billion through the first three quarters of 2011. The Japanese retailer Uniqlo in October 2011 opened its three-story, 89,000-square-foot flagship store on the corner of Fifth Avenue and 53rd Street in Manhattan. The lease it signed—$300 million for 15 years—is the most expensive retail lease in New York’s history. When news broke in December 2011 that former Citigroup CEO Sandy Weill had sold his apartment at 15 Central Park West for the unprecedented price of $88 million, experts wondered which Russian oligarch was behind the purchase. It was fertilizer magnate Dmitry Rybolovlev, who bought it for his 22-year-old daughter. To hear declinists tell it, the U.S. doesn’t make anything anymore. Well, yes, except for the $180 billion in goods and services Americans export every month. Outside the U.S., there are 6.6 billion people with generally rising living standards who are willing and eager to buy what Americans are selling. Since bottoming in April 2009 at $124 billion, monthly exports have risen nearly 50 percent. In 2010, when the economy added 1.03 million new jobs, the number of jobs supported by exports rose by 500,000, from 8.7 million to 9.2 million. More people around the world are eating better, which is good, because the U.S. is to food what Saudi Arabia is to oil. Agricultural exports hit a record $115.8 billion in 2010, and in 2011 soared to $136 billion—nearly double the 2007 total. In a modern-day analogue of carrying coals to Newcastle, the U.S. ships beef to Brazil, rice to Japan, and soybeans to China ($9.19 billion worth in 2009 alone). Total exports to China soared from $41.2 billion in 2005 to $104 billion in 2011. “Every unit that gets manufactured in this site this year is going to be exported,” General Electric CEO Jeff Immelt told employees at the company’s gas-turbine plant in Greenville, S.C., in the spring of 2011. I accompanied Immelt as he walked through the immaculate factory. The 2011 production schedule called for 90 such electricity-generating units, at about $25 million each. Small companies have transformed into export powerhouses, as well. Wallquest, a family-owned high-end wallpaper company outside Philadelphia, saw exports rise from 35 percent of sales in 2009 to 65 percent in 2010, as orders streamed in from Russia, Saudi Arabia, and China. Increasingly, foreigners don’t just buy the stuff Americans make. They buy only-in-America experiences—like higher education. Since 1972 the number of foreign students has risen every year, with the exception of the three years after 9/11. A record 690,923 foreign students enrolled in the 2009–10 academic year, according to the Institute of International Education. “In the countries that are thriving, there’s increasing interest from families who want access to the American higher-education system and are in a position to pay for it,” said Stephen Schutt, president of Lake Forest College, a small liberal-arts college near Chicago (tuition: $38,320). Schutt spent his 2011 spring break in China, visiting secondary schools. Of the 410 students who matriculated in the fall of 2011, 63 (or 15 percent) hailed from 33 countries. Every tuition dollar is an export. Tourism has boomed in the age of decline, too. Those lines of people with funny accents clogging up the lines at Disneyland? They represent exports just as valuable as the bushels of grain being loaded onto container ships in Los Angeles. In 2010, a record 59.8 million international visitors came to the U.S., up 8.7 percent from 2009. That year, tourism was a $134.5 billion export industry. Increasingly, U.S. companies are meeting global consumers where they live. Whether it is Starbucks in Turkey, Mary Kay in China, Taco Bell in India, or an American medical school in the Persian Gulf, U.S. business concepts travel remarkably well. In 2010, for the firms in the S&P 500 stock index that broke out such results separately, 46.3 percent of revenues came from outside the U.S., up from 43.5 percent in 2006. By 2015, market-research company J.D. Power projects, the world’s drivers will purchase 103 million light vehicles per year, and 84 percent of those sales will take place outside U.S. borders. Last November, I went to Shanghai to visit a car plant that wouldn’t seem out of place in Ohio. It belongs to GM Shanghai, a joint venture of General Motors and the Chinese car company SAIC. Here the revived car company is reviving a brand, Buick, that has been left for dead in America. Buick is tapping into a long legacy in China; it is commonly noted that the last emperor owned one. The Buick Excelle, a small vehicle modeled on the Chevrolet Cruze, is a high-volume product: 200,000 are made each year in China. “We’re fully loaded here,” plant manager David Gibbons told me. In the third quarter of 2011 GM sold 620,000 vehicles in China, compared with 555,000 in the U.S. The ways in which U.S. companies continue to gain traction—even at a time when the economic prospects of the U.S. seem dim—was driven home to me by my experience at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, in January. I attended a luncheon and a dinner where the elites hung on every word uttered by Sheryl Sandberg, the chief operating officer at Facebook. At the hottest ticket—the Google party—the crowd was entranced. Once past the velvet ropes, status-hungry attendees were alternately checking out the name tags that hung around people’s necks and looking lovingly ... into their iPhones. High in the Alps, at a confab where American decline is a perennial theme, where new models of dynamism are thought to emerge from everywhere but America, the most significant presences were U.S. companies. Apple and Google are the nation’s second- and ninth-largest companies by market capitalization, with a combined value of nearly $600 billion. Facebook has been valued at more than $100 billion. Yet in 2002, none of these companies existed in anything like their current form. Their combined market cap was a few billion dollars, consisting mostly of Apple, an also-ran personal-computer maker. Google was a piece of code. Mark Zuckerberg was just entering Harvard. All three gained mass and scale during the long expansion of the 2000s, but took off in the years after the Lehman crash. Today, they are iconic magnets of human capital. They represent American economic dynamism the way Chevrolet and McDonald’s once did. Sure, they employ relatively modest numbers of people. But their economic significance lies in the fact that they’ve created platforms for other businesses, industries, and entrepreneurs to create new economic arrangements. Think of what iTunes has done for the publishing, music, and entertainment industries. The U.S. is losing primacy in geopolitics, but it remains the indispensable economic nation. The systems that American companies have invented are being put to vital use. Egypt’s pro-democracy activists organized on Facebook. Syrian dissidents make videos of clashes with the Army on iPhones and upload them for the world to see on YouTube. Highly productive American farmers are feeding the world. Planes manufactured by Boeing provide mobility to people in Africa. It’s easy to look at the record of the past few years and despair. The U.S. has a very long way to go to make up for lost ground in housing and, especially, in jobs. The resurgence of the corporate sector, which provides ample reason for optimism, hasn’t translated into new positions for the legions of unemployed. But here, too, there’s positive news. Since February 2010, the private sector, which accounts for 83 percent of all employment, has added nearly 4.1 million jobs, or about 160,000 per month. That’s not sufficient, but it’s a sign that the jobs machine is clearly working again. The public sector has been the sole source of job loss: austerity-minded government entities have cut a million jobs since 2010. But the sharp reductions have come to a halt. In the months since the Lehman debacle, the U.S. has no more lost its ability to grow and innovate than reality-TV producers have lost their ability to coax skanky behavior out of New Jersey’s youth. And despite all the headwinds, there’s no reason the expansion that started in July 2009 can’t go on as long as the previous three, which lasted 73 months, 120 months, and 92 months, respectively. When the definitive history of this period is written, it is possible—no, likely—that this post-bust era will go down not as a time of economic decline, but as one of regeneration.

#### Cant leverage heg

Maher 11---adjunct prof of pol sci, Brown. PhD expected in 2011 in pol sci, Brown (Richard, The Paradox of American Unipolarity: Why the United States May Be Better Off in a Post-Unipolar World, Orbis 55;1)

At the same time, preeminence creates burdens and facilitates imprudent behavior. Indeed, because of America’s unique political ideology, which sees its own domestic values and ideals as universal, and the relative openness of the foreign policymaking process, the United States is particularly susceptible to both the temptations and burdens of preponderance. For decades, perhaps since its very founding, the United States has viewed what is good for itself as good for the world. During its period of preeminence, the United States has both tried to maintain its position at the top and to transform world politics in fundamental ways, combining elements of realpolitik and liberal universalism (democratic government, free trade, basic human rights). At times, these desires have conflicted with each other but they also capture the enduring tensions of America’s role in the world. The absence of constraints and America’s overestimation of its own ability to shape outcomes has served to weaken its overall position. And because foreign policy is not the reserved and exclusive domain of the president---who presumably calculates strategy according to the pursuit of the state’s enduring national interests---the policymaking process is open to special interests and outside influences and, thus, susceptible to the cultivation of misperceptions, miscalculations, and misunderstandings. Five features in particular, each a consequence of how America has used its power in the unipolar era, have worked to diminish America’s long-term material and strategic position. Overextension. During its period of preeminence, the United States has found it difficult to stand aloof from threats (real or imagined) to its security, interests, and values. Most states are concerned with what happens in their immediate neighborhoods. The United States has interests that span virtually the entire globe, from its own Western Hemisphere, to Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, South Asia, and East Asia. As its preeminence enters its third decade, the United States continues to define its interests in increasingly expansive terms. This has been facilitated by the massive forward presence of the American military, even when excluding the tens of thousands of troops stationed in Iraq and Afghanistan. The U.S. military has permanent bases in over 30 countries and maintains a troop presence in dozens more.13 There are two logics that lead a preeminent state to overextend, and these logics of overextension lead to goals and policies that exceed even the considerable capabilities of a superpower. First, by definition, preeminent states face few external constraints. Unlike in bipolar or multipolar systems, there are no other states that can serve to reliably check or counterbalance the power and influence of a single hegemon. This gives preeminent states a staggering freedom of action and provides a tempting opportunity to shape world politics in fundamental ways. Rather than pursuing its own narrow interests, preeminence provides an opportunity to mix ideology, values, and normative beliefs with foreign policy. The United States has been susceptible to this temptation, going to great lengths to slay dragons abroad, and even to remake whole societies in its own (liberal democratic) image.14 The costs and risks of taking such bold action or pursuing transformative foreign policies often seem manageable or even remote. We know from both theory and history that external powers can impose important checks on calculated risk-taking and serve as a moderating influence. The bipolar system of the Cold War forced policymakers in both the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise extreme caution and prudence. One wrong move could have led to a crisis that quickly spiraled out of policymakers’ control. Second, preeminent states have a strong incentive to seek to maintain their preeminence in the international system. Being number one has clear strategic, political, and psychological benefits. Preeminent states may, therefore, overestimate the intensity and immediacy of threats, or to fundamentally redefine what constitutes an acceptable level of threat to live with. To protect itself from emerging or even future threats, preeminent states may be more likely to take unilateral action, particularly compared to when power is distributed more evenly in the international system. Preeminence has not only made it possible for the United States to overestimate its power, but also to overestimate the degree to which other states and societies see American power as legitimate and even as worthy of emulation. There is almost a belief in historical determinism, or the feeling that one was destined to stand atop world politics as a colossus, and this preeminence gives one a special prerogative for one’s role and purpose in world politics. The security doctrine that the George W. Bush administration adopted took an aggressive approach to maintaining American preeminence and eliminating threats to American security, including waging preventive war. The invasion of Iraq, based on claims that Saddam Hussein possessed weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and had ties to al Qaeda, both of which turned out to be false, produced huge costs for the United States---in political, material, and human terms. After seven years of war, tens of thousands of American military personnel remain in Iraq. Estimates of its long-term cost are in the trillions of dollars.15 At the same time, the United States has fought a parallel conflict in Afghanistan. While the Obama administration looks to dramatically reduce the American military presence in Iraq, President Obama has committed tens of thousands of additional U.S. troops to Afghanistan. Distraction. Preeminent states have a tendency to seek to shape world politics in fundamental ways, which can lead to conflicting priorities and unnecessary diversions. As resources, attention, and prestige are devoted to one issue or set of issues, others are necessarily disregarded or given reduced importance. There are always trade-offs and opportunity costs in international politics, even for a state as powerful as the United States. Most states are required to define their priorities in highly specific terms. Because the preeminent state has such a large stake in world politics, it feels the need to be vigilant against any changes that could impact its short-, medium-, or longterm interests. The result is taking on commitments on an expansive number of issues all over the globe. The United States has been very active in its ambition to shape the postCold War world. It has expanded NATO to Russia’s doorstep; waged war in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan; sought to export its own democratic principles and institutions around the world; assembled an international coalition against transnational terrorism; imposed sanctions on North Korea and Iran for their nuclear programs; undertaken ‘‘nation building’’ in Iraq and Afghanistan; announced plans for a missile defense system to be stationed in Poland and the Czech Republic; and, with the United Kingdom, led the response to the recent global financial and economic crisis. By being so involved in so many parts of the world, there often emerges ambiguity over priorities. The United States defines its interests and obligations in global terms, and defending all of them simultaneously is beyond the pale even for a superpower like the United States. Issues that may have received benign neglect during the Cold War, for example, when U.S. attention and resources were almost exclusively devoted to its strategic competition with the Soviet Union, are now viewed as central to U.S. interests. Bearing Disproportionate Costs of Maintaining the Status Quo. As the preeminent power, the United States has the largest stake in maintaining the status quo. The world the United States took the lead in creating---one based on open markets and free trade, democratic norms and institutions, private property rights and the rule of law---has created enormous benefits for the United States. This is true both in terms of reaching unprecedented levels of domestic prosperity and in institutionalizing U.S. preferences, norms, and values globally. But at the same time, this system has proven costly to maintain. Smaller, less powerful states have a strong incentive to free ride, meaning that preeminent states bear a disproportionate share of the costs of maintaining the basic rules and institutions that give world politics order, stability, and predictability. While this might be frustrating to U.S. policymakers, it is perfectly understandable. Other countries know that the United States will continue to provide these goods out of its own self-interest, so there is little incentive for these other states to contribute significant resources to help maintain these public goods.16 The U.S. Navy patrols the oceans keeping vital sea lanes open. During financial crises around the globe---such as in Asia in 1997-1998, Mexico in 1994, or the global financial and economic crisis that began in October 2008--- the U.S. Treasury rather than the IMF takes the lead in setting out and implementing a plan to stabilize global financial markets. The United States has spent massive amounts on defense in part to prevent great power war. The United States, therefore, provides an indisputable collective good---a world, particularly compared to past eras, that is marked by order, stability, and predictability. A number of countries---in Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia---continue to rely on the American security guarantee for their own security. Rather than devoting more resources to defense, they are able to finance generous social welfare programs. To maintain these commitments, the United States has accumulated staggering budget deficits and national debt. As the sole superpower, the United States bears an additional though different kind of weight. From the Israeli-Palestinian dispute to the India Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir, the United States is expected to assert leadership to bring these disagreements to a peaceful resolution. The United States puts its reputation on the line, and as years and decades pass without lasting settlements, U.S. prestige and influence is further eroded. The only way to get other states to contribute more to the provision of public goods is if the United States dramatically decreases its share. At the same time, the United States would have to give other states an expanded role and greater responsibility given the proportionate increase in paying for public goods. This is a political decision for the United States---maintain predominant control over the provision of collective goods or reduce its burden but lose influence in how these public goods are used. Creation of Feelings of Enmity and Anti-Americanism. It is not necessary that everyone admire the United States or accept its ideals, values, and goals. Indeed, such dramatic imbalances of power that characterize world politics today almost always produce in others feelings of mistrust, resentment, and outright hostility. At the same time, it is easier for the United States to realize its own goals and values when these are shared by others, and are viewed as legitimate and in the common interest. As a result of both its vast power but also some of the decisions it has made, particularly over the past eight years, feelings of resentment and hostility toward the United States have grown, and perceptions of the legitimacy of its role and place in the world have correspondingly declined. Multiple factors give rise toanti-American sentiment, and anti-Americanism takes different shapes and forms.17 It emerges partly as a response to the vast disparity in power the United States enjoys over other states. Taking satisfaction in themissteps and indiscretions of the imposing Gulliver is a natural reaction. In societies that globalization (which in many parts of the world is interpreted as equivalent to Americanization) has largely passed over, resentment and alienation are felt when comparing one’s own impoverished, ill-governed, unstable society with the wealth, stability, and influence enjoyed by the United States.18 Anti-Americanism also emerges as a consequence of specific American actions and certain values and principles to which the United States ascribes. Opinion polls showed that a dramatic rise in anti-American sentiment followed the perceived unilateral decision to invade Iraq (under pretences that failed to convince much of the rest of the world) and to depose Saddam Hussein and his government and replace itwith a governmentmuchmore friendly to the United States. To many, this appeared as an arrogant and completely unilateral decision by a single state to decide for itselfwhen---and under what conditions---military force could be used. A number of other policy decisions by not just the George W. Bush but also the Clinton and Obama administrations have provoked feelings of anti-American sentiment. However, it seemed that a large portion of theworld had a particular animus for GeorgeW. Bush and a number of policy decisions of his administration, from voiding the U.S. signature on the International Criminal Court (ICC), resisting a global climate change treaty, detainee abuse at Abu Ghraib in Iraq and at Guantanamo Bay in Cuba, and what many viewed as a simplistic worldview that declared a ‘‘war’’ on terrorism and the division of theworld between goodand evil.Withpopulations around theworld mobilized and politicized to a degree never before seen---let alone barely contemplated---such feelings of anti-American sentiment makes it more difficult for the United States to convince other governments that the U.S.’ own preferences and priorities are legitimate and worthy of emulation. Decreased Allied Dependence. It is counterintuitive to think that America’s unprecedented power decreases its allies’ dependence on it. During the Cold War, for example, America’s allies were highly dependent on the United States for their own security. The security relationship that the United States had with Western Europe and Japan allowed these societies to rebuild and reach a stunning level of economic prosperity in the decades following World War II. Now that the United States is the sole superpower and the threat posed by the Soviet Union no longer exists, these countries have charted more autonomous courses in foreign and security policy. A reversion to a bipolar or multipolar system could change that, making these allies more dependent on the United States for their security. Russia’s reemergence could unnerve America’s European allies, just as China’s continued ascent could provoke unease in Japan. Either possibility would disrupt the equilibrium in Europe and East Asia that the United States has cultivated over the past several decades. New geopolitical rivalries could serve to create incentives for America’s allies to reduce the disagreements they have with Washington and to reinforce their security relationships with the United States.

#### [If time]Alliances are out dated, multi-polarity is stable and there is no scenario for war in a world of US decline

**Friedman et al., MIT political science PhD candidate, 2012**

(Benjamin, “Why the U.S. Military Budget is ‘Foolish and Sustainable”, Orbis, 56.2, Science Direct, ldg)

Standard arguments for maintaining the alliances come in two contradictory strains. One, drawn mostly from the run-up to World War II, says that without American protection, the ally would succumb to a rival power, either by force or threat of force, heightening the rival’s capability and danger to the United States. The other argument says that without the United States, the ally would enter a spiral of hostility with a neighbor, creating instability or war that disrupts commerce and costs America more than the protection that prevented it. The main problem with the first argument is that no hegemon today threatens to unify Europe or Asia. Europe is troubled by debt, not conquest. Russian GDP is today roughly equivalent to that of Spain and Portugal combined. Whatever Russia’s hopes, it has no ability to resurrect its Soviet Empire, beyond perhaps those nations in its near abroad that Americans have no good reason to defend. Even today, the military capabilities of Europe’s leading powers are sufficient to defend its eastern flank, and they could increase their martial exertions should a bigger threat arise. Asia is tougher case. South Korea’s military superiority over its northern neighbor is sufficient to deter it from an attempt at forcible reunification. By heightening North Korea’s security, nuclear weapons may reinforce its capacity for trouble-making, but they do not aid offensive forays. U.S. forces long ago became unnecessary to maintaining the peninsula’s territorial status quo. Chinese efforts to engage in old-fashioned conquest are unlikely, at least beyond Taiwan. Its more probable objective is a kind of Asian Monroe doctrine, meant to exclude the United States.6 China naturally prefers not to leave its maritime security at the whim of U.S. policymakers and, thus, has sought to improve its anti-access and area-denial capabilities. In the longer term, China’s leaders will likely pursue the ability to secure its trade routes by building up longer-range naval forces. They may also try to leverage military power to extract various concessions from nearby states. Washington’s defense analysts typically take those observations as sufficient to establish the necessity that U.S. forces remain in Asia to balance Chinese military power. But to justify a U.S. military presence there, one also needs to show both that Asian nations cannot or will not balance Chinese power themselves and that their failure to do so would greatly harm U.S. security. Neither is likely. Geography and economics suggest that the states of the region will successfully balance Chinese power—even if we assume that China’s economic growth allows it to continue to increase military spending.7 Bodies of water are natural defenses against offensive military operations. They allow weaker states to achieve security at relatively low cost by investing in naval forces and coastal defenses. That defensive advantage makes balances of power more stable. Not only are several of China’s Asian rivals islands, but those states have the wealth to make Chinese landings on their coast prohibitively expensive. India’s mountainous northern border creates similar dynamics. The prospects of Asian states successfully deterring future Chinese aggression will get even better if, as seems likely, threats of aggression provoke more formal security alliances. Some of that is already occurring. Note for example, the recent joint statement issued by the Philippines and Japan marking a new ‘‘strategic partnership’’ and expressing ‘‘common strategic interests’’ such as ‘‘ensuring the safety of sea lines of communication.’’8 This sort of multilateral cooperation would likely deepen with a more distant U.S. role. Alliances containing disproportionately large states historically produce free-riding; weaker alliance partners lose incentive to shore up their own defenses.9 Even if one assumes that other states in the region would fail to balance China, it is unclear exactly how U.S. citizens would suffer. China’s territorial ambitions might grow but are unlikely to span the Pacific. Nor would absorbing a few small export-oriented states slacken China’s hunger for the dollars of American consumers. The argument that U.S. alliances are necessary for stability and global commerce is only slightly more credible. One problem with this claim is that U.S. security guarantees can create moral hazard—emboldening weak allies to take risks they would otherwise avoid in their dealings with neighbors. Alliances can then discourage accommodation among neighboring states, heightening instability and threatening to pull the United States into wars facilitated by its benevolence. Another point against this argument is that even if regional balancing did lead to war, it would not obviously be more costly to the U.S. economy than the cost of the alliance said to prevent it. Neutrality historically pays.10 The larger problem with the idea that our alliances are justified by the balancing they prevent is that wars generally require more than the mutual fear that arms competition provokes. Namely, there is usually a territorial conflict or a state bent on conflict. Historical examples of arms races alone causing wars are few.11 This confusion probably results from misconstruing the causes of World War I—seeing it as a consequence of mutual fear alone rather than fear produced by the proximity of territorially ambitious states.12 Balances of power, as noted, are especially liable to be stable when water separates would-be combatants, as in modern Asia. Japan would likely increase defense spending if U.S. forces left it, and that would likely displease China. But that tension is very unlikely to provoke a regional conflagration. And even that remote scenario is far more likely than the Rube Goldberg scenario needed to argue that peace in Europe requires U.S. forces stationed there. It is not clear that European states would even increase military spending should U.S. troops depart. If they did do so, one struggles to imagine a chain of misperceived hostility sufficient to resurrect the bad old days of European history.